{"id":18,"date":"2023-08-07T13:53:46","date_gmt":"2023-08-07T13:53:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/faculty.law.harvard.edu\/adriaan-lanni\/?page_id=18"},"modified":"2023-11-15T20:37:15","modified_gmt":"2023-11-15T20:37:15","slug":"bibliography","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/faculty.law.harvard.edu\/einer-elhauge\/bibliography\/","title":{"rendered":"Bibliography"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Books<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

United States Antitrust Law & Economics<\/strong> (3d ed., Foundation Press 2018)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Global Antitrust Law & Economics<\/strong> (Elhauge and Geradin, 3d ed., Foundation Press 2018)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Research Handbook on the Economics of Antitrust Law<\/a><\/strong>
(Elhauge ed., Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2013)
To purchase the book in hard copy, please go to Edward Elgar Publishing <\/a>or <\/em>Amazon.com<\/a>.<\/em> To purchase the book in ebook format, go to <\/em>Google Play<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Obamacare on Trial<\/strong>
(2012) Available in paperback <\/a><\/em>and on Kindle<\/a>, Nook<\/a> and Smashwords<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care — Causes and Solutions<\/a><\/strong> (Elhauge ed., Oxford University Press 2010)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Statutory Default Rules: How to Interpret Unclear Legislation<\/a><\/strong>
(Harvard University Press 2008)
To purchase the book in hard copy, please go to Harvard University Press<\/a> or Amazon.com<\/a><\/em>. To purchase the book in ebook format, go to Google Play<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Antitrust Law, Vol X, <\/strong>(Areeda, Elhauge and Hovenkamp, Little, Brown 1996)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Articles<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Brito, Elhauge, Ribeiro, and Vasconcelos,<\/strong> Modeling the Objective Function of Managers in the Presence of Overlapping Shareholding<\/strong><\/a>,<\/strong> INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 87 (2023) 102905.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Should the Competitive Process Test Replace the Consumer Welfare Standard?<\/a>,<\/strong> PROMARKET (May 24, 2022)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Inevitability and Desirability of the Corporate Discretion to Advance Stakeholder Interests,<\/a><\/strong> 106 CORNELL LAW REVIEW (2021)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Causal Mechanisms of Horizontal Shareholding,<\/a><\/strong> 82 OHIO STATE L.J. 1 (2021)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Einer Elhauge, <\/strong>Sumit K. Majumdar & Martin C. Schmalz,<\/strong> Confronting Horizontal Ownership Concentration<\/a>,<\/strong> 66 Antitrust Bull. 3 (2021)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

How Horizontal Shareholding Harms Our Economy\u2014And Why Antitrust Law Can Fix It,<\/a><\/strong> 10 HARVARD BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 207 (2020)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

New Evidence, Proofs, and Legal Theories on Horizontal Shareholding<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
Available at SSRN: https:\/\/ssrn.com\/abstract=3096812<\/a> (January 4, 2018)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Growing Problem of Horizontal Shareholding<\/a><\/strong><\/em>,<\/em> 3 ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 1 (June 2017)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Elhauge & Nalebuff, <\/strong>The Welfare Effects of Metering Ties<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
33 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 68 (2017)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Contrived Threats v. Uncontrived Warnings: A General Solution to the Puzzles of Contractual Duress, Unconstitutional Conditions, and Blackmail<\/strong><\/a><\/em>
83 U. Chicago Law Review 503 (2016)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Horizontal Shareholding<\/strong><\/a><\/em>
129 Harvard Law Review 1269 (2016)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish: Why Ties Without a Substantial Foreclosure Share Should Not Be Per Se Legal,<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
80 Antitrust Law Journal 463 (2016)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

McGuire, Drake, Elhauge, Hartman & Starr, Resolving Reverse-Payment Settlements With The Smoking Gun Of Stock Price Movements<\/a><\/em><\/strong>
101 Iowa L. Rev. 1581 (2016)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Elhauge & Wickelgren, Robust Exclusion and Market Division Through Loyalty Discounts<\/a><\/em><\/strong>,
43 International Journal of Industrial Organization<\/em> 111 (Nov. 2015) (Awarded Best Academic Anticompetitive Practice Article – 2015 Antitrust Writing Awards)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

How Italian Colors Guts Private Antitrust Enforcement by Replacing It With Ineffective Forms Of Arbitration<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
38 Fordham Int’l L. J. 771 (2015).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Treating RAND Commitments Neutrally<\/strong><\/a><\/em>
11 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 1 (2015).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Obamacare and the Theory of the Firm<\/strong><\/em><\/a>
in The Future of Health Care Reform (Malani and Schill, eds., U. Chicago Press 2015)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I\u2019m Not Quite Dead Yet — And Other Health Care Observations<\/em><\/strong><\/a>
49 Tulsa L. Rev. 607 (2014)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Elhauge & Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle<\/a><\/em><\/strong>
91 Texas Law Review 283 (2012)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Introduction and Overview to Current Issues in Antitrust Economics<\/em><\/strong><\/a>
in the Research Handbook on the Economics of Antitrust Law (Elhauge ed., Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2012)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Irrelevance of the Broccoli Argument against the Insurance Mandate<\/em><\/strong><\/a>
New England Journal of Medicine (Dec 21, 2011)

Why the Google Books Settlement is Procompetitive<\/em><\/strong><\/a>
2(1) Journal Of Legal Analysis 1 (2010)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why We Should Care about Health Care Fragmentation and How to Fix It,<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
in The Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care: Causes and Solutions 1
(Oxford University Press 2010)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Failed Resurrection of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory<\/em><\/strong><\/a>
6(1) Competition Policy International 155 (Spring 2010)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
123 Harvard Law Review 397 (2009) (Awarded Jerry S. Cohen Memorial Fund Writing Award)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Framing the Antitrust Issues in the Google Books Settlement<\/em><\/a><\/strong>
Global Competition Pol\u2019y, (October 2009 Release 2)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
76 Antitrust Law Journal 79 (2009)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

How Loyalty Discounts Can Perversely Discourage Discounting<\/em><\/strong><\/a>
5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 189 (2009)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?<\/em><\/strong><\/a>
4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 535 (2008)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

How Should Competition Law Be Taught?<\/em><\/strong><\/a>
4(1) Competition Policy International 267 (Spring 2008)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent Supreme Court Decisions?<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
3(2) Competition Policy International 59 (Autumn 2007)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 365 (2006)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
80 N.Y.U. Law Review 733 (2005)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Corporate Manager’s Operational Discretion to Sacrifice Corporate Profits in the Public Interest<\/strong><\/em>,
in Environmental Protection and the Social Responsibility of Firms 13-76
(Bruce Hay, Robert Stavins, & Richard Vietor eds.,2005)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Defining Better Monopolization Standards<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
56 Stanford Law Review 253 (2003)

Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory – And the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
112Yale Law Journal 681 (2003)

Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
102 Columbia Law Review 2027 (2002)

Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
102 Columbia Law Review 2162 (2002)

The Lessons of Florida 2000<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
110 Policy Review15 (Dec 2001 -Jan 2002).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What Term Limits Do That Ordinary Voting Cannot<\/a>,<\/strong><\/em>
Cato Policy Analysis, No. 328 (Dec. 16, 1998)

Are Term Limits Undemocratic?,<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
64 U. Chic. L. Rev. 83 (1997)

Elhauge, Lott & Manning, <\/strong>How Term Limits Enhance the Expression Of Democratic Preferences,<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
5 Supreme Court Econ. Rev. 59 (1997)

The Limited Regulatory Potential of Medical Technology Assessment,<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
82 Va. L. Rev. 1525 (1996)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Allocating Health Care Morally<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
82 Calif. L. Rev. 1449 (1994)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Toward a European Sale of Control Doctrine<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
41 Am. J. Comp. Law 627 (1993)

Bundy & Elhauge,\u00a0<\/strong>Knowledge About Legal Sanctions<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
92 Mich. L. Rev. 261 (1993)

The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
59 U. Chic. L. Rev. 1465 (1992)

Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
80 Calif. L. Rev. 1177 (1992)

Bundy & Elhauge,<\/strong>Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
79 Calif. L. Rev. 313 (1991)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Scope of Antitrust Process<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
104 Harv. L. Rev. 667 (1991)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
101 Yale L.J. 31 (1991)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Professional Writings<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Why Ted Cruz Is Not A Natural Born Citizen Eligible To Be President And Why The Issue Is Not A Political Question<\/strong><\/a>
(Amicus Brief to NY appellate court)<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Amicus Brief in North Carolina Dental Board v. FTC<\/a><\/strong>
(Before US Supreme Court)<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cert Petition in PSKS v Leegin<\/a><\/strong>
(Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit)<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Antitrust Analysis of GPO Exclusionary Agreements<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
(Comments Regarding Hearings on Health Care and Competition Law and Policy – Statement for DOJ-FTC Hearing on GPO’s – Sept. 26, 2003)<\/em>

Amicus Brief in Partisan Gerrymandering Case Before Supreme Court<\/a><\/strong><\/em>
(Brief Amicus Curiae of Democratic Pennsylvania Voters Joann Erfer and Jeffrey B. Albert in Support of Apellants in Vieth v. Jubilirer)<\/em>

The Exclusion of Competition for Hospital Sales Through Group Purchasing Organizations<\/a><\/strong>
(report to U.S. Senate)<\/em>
Tunney Act Comments of Professor Einer Elhauge on the Proposed Settlement between the United States and Microsoft<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Media Writings<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Donald Trump: The Protector<\/strong><\/a> The Atlantic (March 2, 2016)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ted Cruz Is Not Eligible to Run for President<\/strong><\/a> Salon (Jan. 20, 2016)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Best Way to Reform Health Care\u2014and Cut the Deficit<\/strong><\/a> The Daily Beast (January 6, 2013)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Roberts’s Real Long Game?<\/strong><\/a> The Atlantic (July 20, 2012)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Fatal Flaw in John Roberts’ Analysis of the Commerce Clause<\/strong><\/a> The Atlantic (July 20, 2012)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Killer Precedent for Today\u2019s Decision<\/strong><\/a> The New Republic (June 28, 2012)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even the Most Conservative Supreme Court Justices Have Already Declared Mandates Constitutional<\/a><\/strong> The New Republic (June 21, 2012)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What a Nobel Prize-Winning Economist Can Teach Us About Obamacare<\/strong><\/a> The Atlantic (May 23, 2012)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Further Response to Critics on the Founding Fathers and Insurance Mandates<\/strong><\/a> The New Republic (April 21, 2012)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Response to Critics on the Founding Fathers and Health Insurance Mandates<\/strong><\/a> The New Republic (April 19, 2012)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It’s Not About Broccoli!: The False Case Against Health Care<\/strong><\/a> The Atlantic (April 16, 2012)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If Health Insurance Mandates Are Unconstitutional, Why Did the Founding Fathers Back Them?<\/strong><\/a> The New Republic (April 13, 2012)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Commentary: The Roberts-Kagan Compromise on Obamacare?<\/strong><\/a> The National Law Journal (March 28, 2012)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Don\u2019t Blame Verrilli for Supreme Court Health-Care Stumble<\/strong><\/a> The Daily Beast (March 28, 2012)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Economists Argue Over the Cost of Caring for the Uninsured<\/a><\/strong> The Daily Beast (March 26, 2012).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Broccoli Test<\/a><\/strong> New York Times (Nov. 16, 2011)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Coverage vs Coercion<\/a><\/strong> The Huffington Post (March 3, 2008)

Rewire This Circuit<\/a> <\/strong>The Wall Street Journal, A26 (Sept. 17, 2003)

Soft on Microsoft<\/a><\/strong> The Weekly Standard (March 25, 2002)

Despite What the Critics Say, it Wasn’t a Bag Job,”<\/a> <\/strong>Boston Globe (March 3, 2002)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Florida 2000: Bush Wins Again!,”<\/a> <\/strong>Weekly Standard (November 26, 2001 )

State Made The Right Call On Microsoft<\/strong> The Hartford Courant (Nov. 9, 2001)

States Should Seek More From Microsoft,<\/strong> San Francisco Chronicle (Nov. 6, 2001)

A Smart Move on Microsoft,<\/a><\/strong> Boston Globe (Sept. 11, 2001)

Competition Wins in Court,<\/a> <\/strong>New York Times, (June 30, 2001)

Bush v. Florida,<\/a><\/strong> New York Times, A31 (Nov. 20, 2000)

Florida’s Vote Wasn’t ‘Irregular,<\/a> <\/strong>Wall Street Journal (Nov. 13, 2000)

The New ‘New Property,<\/a><\/strong> San Francisco Chronicle (Nov. 6, 2000)

The Real Problem with Independent Counsels,<\/a><\/strong> The Washington Times, A19 (Jun 30, 1999)

Foul Smoke,<\/a> <\/strong>The Washington Post, A15 (August 4, 1998)

The Court Failed My Test,<\/a> <\/strong>The Washington Times, A-19 (July 10, 1998)

Microsoft Gets an Undeserved Break,<\/a><\/strong> The New York Times,A21 (June 29, 1998)

Medi-Choice,<\/a> <\/strong>The New Republic, 24 (November 13,1995)

Term Limits: Voters Aren’t Schizophrenic,<\/a><\/strong> Wall Street Journal, A-16 (March 14, 1995)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Books United States Antitrust Law & Economics (3d ed., Foundation Press 2018) Global Antitrust Law & Economics (Elhauge and Geradin, 3d ed., Foundation Press 2018) Research Handbook on the Economics of Antitrust Law(Elhauge ed., Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2013)To purchase the book in hard copy, please go to Edward Elgar Publishing or Amazon.com. To purchase the book in ebook format, go …<\/p>\n

Bibliography<\/span> Read More »<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-18","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"featured_image_src":null,"featured_image_src_square":null,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/faculty.law.harvard.edu\/einer-elhauge\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/18","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/faculty.law.harvard.edu\/einer-elhauge\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/faculty.law.harvard.edu\/einer-elhauge\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/faculty.law.harvard.edu\/einer-elhauge\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/faculty.law.harvard.edu\/einer-elhauge\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=18"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/faculty.law.harvard.edu\/einer-elhauge\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/18\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/faculty.law.harvard.edu\/einer-elhauge\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=18"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}