The Massachusetts Land Court has held that property used for weekly rentals violate the town zoning ordinance that limits the property to single-family residences. Lytle v. Swiec, 2017 WL 2257702 (Mass. Land Ct. 2017). The case may have implications for AirBnb and other such short-term rental operations. See Zoning By-Law of the Town of Hull, §31-1.
In Murr v. Wisconsin, 2017 WL 2694699 (U.S. 2017), the Supreme Court held that a zoning law that treated two contiguous parcels owned by the same persons as one parcel to determine minimum developable lot size was not an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. The merger law provided for variances that might allow development for lots that contained less than one acre of developable space but did not provide for such a variance if two lots were merged. One lot had a house on it and the other was vacant. The owners claimed that the vacant lot had no economically beneficial use since it could not be separately developed. However, the Supreme Court held that the denominator to determine the economic impact of the regulation was the “parcel as a whole” and that in this case that meant the merged parcels. Moreover, even if the two lots could be developed separately, …
Supreme Court rejects regulatory takings challenge to zoning merger provision Read More »
The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibits enforcement of a provision of the Lanham Act that purports to deny the benefits of trademark registration to names or marks that “disparage” a person or “bring [them] into contempt or disrepute.” Matal v. Tam,2017 WL 2621315 (U.S. 2017); 15 U.S.C. §1502(a) (Lanham Act). The Court held that “this provision violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It offends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.” The case involved a band called “The Slants” who sought to reclaim an offensive term for persons of Asian descent. Because the Court’s analysis focused on the idea that speech cannot be regulated because of its offensive content, it would appear that this ruling would equally apply to those who use a term about themselves (the members of the Slants are Asian-Americans) …
On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court took certiorari in this case under the name, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n. (No. 16-111). The Colorado Court of Appeals has affirmed the Civil Rights Division’s that a bakery must sell wedding cakes to same-sex couples if they would ordinarily do so to male-female couples. Mullins v. Masterpiece, 2015 Colo. App. LEXIS 121, 2015 COA 115 (Colo. App. 2015). State law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in public accommodations, and neither the state statute itself nor the constitution entitles the providers of goods and services to engage in proscribed discrimination for religious reasons. The court rejected the bakery’s contention that it was acting on the basis of an opposition to same-sex marriage rather than an intent to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. The court held that it did not matter that the bakery would sell baked goods other than a …
Lands owned by Indian nations and held in trust status cannot be taken by the states by eminent domain, although federal statutory authority allows states to take “allotments” held by the United States in trust for individual tribal citizens for public purposes including utility easements. 25 U.S.C. §357. The Tenth Circuit has held that if the tribe (in this case the Navajo Nation) owns a fractional interest in an allotment, then the state (or its service companies) cannot use eminent domain power to take a utility easement from those allotment owners. Public Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Barboan, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9204 (10th Cir. 2017). The only way to acquire such an easement is for the land to be taken by the eminent domain power of the United States or in a voluntary sale with the consent of the relevant Indian nation and required consent by the United States generally exercised …
States may not take tribal land by eminent domain Read More »
Courts traditionally refuse to recognize aesthetic nuisances. The mere objection to the appearance of structures on neighboring property is insufficient to constitute a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land. Although some courts in recent years have recognized the possibility of an aesthetic nuisance, the Vermont Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the traditional rule when owners complained of ugly solar panels on neighboring property owned by companies that used the land to construct solar arrays. Myrick v. Peck Elec. Co., 2017 V. 4, 2017 Vt. LEXIS 4 (2017). “An unattractive sight — without more — is not a substantial interference as a matter of law because the mere appearance of the property of another does not affect a citizen’s ability to use and enjoy his or her neighboring land.” Id. at ¶5.
Courts traditionally refuse to recognize aesthetic nuisances. The mere objection to the appearance of structures on neighboring property is insufficient to constitute a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land. Although some courts in recent years have recognized the possibility of an aesthetic nuisance, the Vermont Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the traditional rule when owners complained of ugly solar panels on neighboring property owned by companies that used the land to construct solar arrays. Myrick v. Peck Elec. Co., 2017 V. 4, 2017 Vt. LEXIS 4 (2017). “An unattractive sight — without more — is not a substantial interference as a matter of law because the mere appearance of the property of another does not affect a citizen’s ability to use and enjoy his or her neighboring land.” Id. at ¶5.
The Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed the traditional rule that part performance of a real estate agreement can constitute an exception to the statute of frauds. If that is the case, a contract that would otherwise be unenforceable because it does not comply with the statutory writing formalities may be enforced nonetheless. Hoke v. NeYada, 387 P.3d 118 (Idaho 2016). The case involved a lease with an option to purchase. Because the “buyer” had already entered into possession of the property and needed only to make the required payments, the agreement was enforceable despite the fact that the land description was not sufficiently precise to satisfy the statute of frauds.
The Georgia Supreme Court has interpreted a will leaving land to the “surviving heir or heirs” of the decedent’s child as creating a life estate in the child with a contingent remainder in the child’s heirs. Anderson v. Anderson, 791 S.E. 2d 40 (Ga. 2016)
Applying Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §1681, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a three judge panel of the Seventh Circuit has ruled that a school must allow a transgender boy to use the boy’s bathroom, holding that discrimination on the basis of gender idenitty is a form of sex discrimination. Whitaker v. Kenosha Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9362 (7th Cir. 2017). The court affirmed a preliminary injunction granted by the District Court requiring the school to allow plaintiff access to the restroom that conforms to his gender identity. The court rested on the gender conformity argument because “[b]y definition, a transgender individual does not conform to the sex-based stereotypes of the sex that he or she was assigned at birth” and a “policy that requires an individual to use a bathroom that …
Seventh Circuit holds that transgender discrimination is a form of sex discrimination Read More »
