Homelessness

Eighth Amendment prohibits punishing homeless people for using bedding supplies like blankets, pillows, or sleeping bags while sleeping on public lands when there are no available shelter beds

/ Homelessness, Trespass

In a straightforward application of the ruling in Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2018), the Ninth Circuit held that an Oregon city could not punish homeless people for “camping” on public property and using bedding supplies, such as blankets or pillows or sleeping bags, while doing so, when there were no available beds in city homeless shelters. Johnson v. City of Grants Pass, 50 F.4th 868 (9th Cir. 2023). The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishing someone for engaging in actions like sleeping that are necessary to human life when there is no place where they are legally entitled to do those things. Punishing someone in such circumstances effectively penalizes them for the status of being homeless and that violates rule of law norms. “The anti-camping ordinances [here] prohibit Plaintiffs from engaging in activity they cannot avoid,” the court explained. Nor can the city avoid this by criminalizing “using …

Eighth Amendment prohibits punishing homeless people for using bedding supplies like blankets, pillows, or sleeping bags while sleeping on public lands when there are no available shelter beds Read More »

Extended stay hotel residents are tenants

/ Homelessness, Leaseholds

A Georgia court has ruled that residents of extended stay hotels should be classified as tenants with the protections granted by landlord-tenant law. That means they can be removed only by court eviction procedures rather than self-help. Efficiency Lodge, Inc. v. Neason, 870 S.E.2d 549 (Ga. 2022).

9th Circuit holds that the Constitution prohibits punishing homeless people for sleeping outdoors when there is no alternative

/ Homelessness, Trespass

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment prevents a city from imposing criminal penalties on homeless persons when they have no legal alternative alternative. Martin v. City of Boise, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 9453 (9th Cir. 2019). The City of Boise had two municipal ordinances – disorderly conduct and anticamping laws – that prohibited sleeping in parks. After being convicted for violating those laws, homeless persons challenged them because there were not enough shelter beds for everyone and they had no other place to sleep. The city police responded by issue a “Special Order” prohibiting enforcement of either ordinance when none of the three existing shelters had “an available overnight space.” However, the court found evidence that the police enforced the ordinances when shelter space was unavailable. Citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), Pottinger v. …

9th Circuit holds that the Constitution prohibits punishing homeless people for sleeping outdoors when there is no alternative Read More »

Section 8 (housing voucher) tenants cannot be evicted without cause even if their lease term has expired and the landlord has opted out of the housing assistance program

/ Consumer Protection, Homelessness, Leaseholds, Real Estate Transactions, Restraints on Alienation

The Third Circuit has ruled that the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. §1437f(t)(1)(B), that gives Section 8 (housing voucher) tenants the right to “remain in their housing developments, even after their landlord has opted out of the federal housing assistance program,” gives them the right to stay unless just cause can be shown to evict have the right to remain even if the lease term has expired. Hayes v. Harvey, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 24848 (3d Cir. 2018).

Is it an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation to require sex offenders to move away from their home if a school, playground, or daycare center is established near their home after their initial occupation?

/ Consumer Protection, Estates and Future Interests, Homelessness, Takings

In Mann v. Georgia Department of Corrections,653 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007), the Georgia Supreme Court held that a state statute prohibiting registered sex offenders from living or working within 1,000 feet of any facility where minors congregate, see Ga. Code Åò42-1-15, constituted a taking of property as applied to a sex offender who was forced to move after a child care center opened a facility within 1,000 feet of his home. The court noted that “it is apparent that there is no place in Georgia where a registered sex offender can live without being continually at risk of being ejected.” 653 S.E.2d at 755. Moreover, the effect of the statute “is to mandate appellant’s immediate physical removal from his . . . residence.” The court noted “the strong governmental interests that are advanced by the residency restriction” on sex offenders, but also found that the law effectively allowed “private third parties” …

Is it an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation to require sex offenders to move away from their home if a school, playground, or daycare center is established near their home after their initial occupation? Read More »

Sex offender cannot be evicted from state-subsidized housing because of regulatory limitation imposed after the lease began

/ Antidiscrimination Law, Consumer Protection, Due Process, Homelessness

The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that a registered sex offender cannot be evicted from housing subisidized by the state when he obtained the subsidy and the housing before passage of the state law banning such assistance. Shannon v. Comm’r of Housing, 140 A.3d 903 (Conn. 2016) (see dissenting opinion here). The court applied a state law that provides that any law that imposes “any new obligation on any person or corporation shall [not] be construed to have a retroactive effect.” Conn. Gen. Stat. §55-3. Under that law a new regulation that denies housing assistance to registered sex offenders could not be applied retroactively. The Court noted, however, that “although there is a property interest in the receipt of a public benefit so long as it is available, without statutory terms restricting its authority to do so, the legislature remains free to change or eliminate benefit entitlements by amending or repealing the …

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Homeless persons may raise defense of necessity to criminal trespass charges when entering property in winter to escape bitter cold

/ Homelessness, Trespass

In Commonwealth v. Magadini, Commonwealth v. Magadini, 2015 WL 11070269 (Mass. 2016), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that a homeless man who repeatedly entered private property in winter time to escape the cold was entitled to try to convince the jury that necessity justified the entries. David Magadini was homeless and was arrested and convicted seven times for sleeping in the lobby or hallway of commercial buildings that included retail establishments, offices, and apartments. Magadini was a lifelong resident of Great Barrington, Massachusetts, had no home, and had been barred in the past from staying a s homeless shelter in the town. The court held that necessity justifies trespass if (1) he faces a “clear and imminent danger”; (2) a reasonable expectation that the entry on property will abate the danger; (3) he has no “legal alternative which will be effective in abating the danger;” and (4) the “Legislature has not acted …

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Local sex offender law violates state regulatory provisions

/ Homelessness, Restraints on Alienation, Zoning

Like other cities, the City of Lynn in Massachusetts sought to regulate where sex offenders live. It prohibited certain sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of a school or park and defined “school” to include all public, private, and church schools. The effect of the ordinance was to prevent sex offenders from spending a night in ninety-five percent of the city, including in a shelter or half-way house designated for sex offenders. The Supreme Judicial Court struck down the local ordinance as exceeding the scope of local government powers because it was inconsistent with state legislation establishing a sex offender registry and regulating sex offenders. Doe v. City of Lynn, 36 N.E.3d 18 (Mass. 2015). The local law effectively would make sex offenders homeless and would make it impossible for state authorities to track them to protect the public. In addition, the state statutes had a much narrower set of rules …

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Sex offender residency law struck down as unconstitutional by California Supreme Court

/ Due Process, Homelessness

The California Supreme Court has struck down a voter initiative that barred all sex offenders from living within 2000 feet of schools and parks. In re Taylor, 83 U.S.L.W. 1299, 2015 BL 54822 (Cal. 2015). The court held that the ban deprived sex offenders of liberty without due process of law because it rendered many sex offenders homeless and was not reasonably related to government interests in protecting children. Because 97 percent of the county was off limits to sex offenders, many had no place where they could live or receive medical treatment and services, depriving them of constitutionally protected liberty interests. The law also  made it difficult or impossible for the sex offenders to be monitored by parole officers, thereby defeating the purpose of the regulation and depriving it of any rational relationship to the legitimate government objective of protecting the public.

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