Adverse Possession

The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that mowing grass and trimming bushes is not sufficiently “open and notorious” to put a reasonable owner on notice that someone is taking possession of the land. NC Enters., LLC v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 2026 WL 1113731 (Ohio 2026). Some other courts agree. See Siedlik v. Nissen, 931 N.W.2d 439 (Neb. 2019); Warren v. Burnham, 573 P.3d 421 (Or. Ct. App. 2025). The holding is notable since some other courts have found to the contrary. See Union Cemetery Burial Soc’y of N. Smithfield v. Foisy, 292 A.3d 1205 (R.I. 2023); Jutting v. Hendrix, 606 N.W.2d 140, 142 (S.D. 2000). Cf. Ballard v. Harman, 737 N.E.2d 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (planting 50 trees sufficient to obtain adverse possession). The court justified its ruling by taking the possession that adverse possession is “disfavored” and the requirements to show its various elements “are stringent.” […]

In an adverse possession case involving conflicting deeds, the Georgia Supreme Court applied the traditional rule that one can acquire adverse possession by color of title only if the adverse possessor actually possesses at least part of the property described in the purported deed. Brownphil v. Cudjoe, 915 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. 2025).

Some states require a “claim of right” to obtain property by adverse possession. This supposed element of the claim is confusing because it is not clear what it adds to the other requirements: nonpermissive visible continuous exclusive possession for the statutory period. In general, this phrase simply differentiates ordinary adverse possession cases from ones based on “color of title” where a deed or other granting instrument is defective (and thus does not pass title to the grantee) while the grantee occupies the property for the statutory period. The Alabama Supreme Court clarified the claim of right idea by stating that it means that “an adverse possessor has an intention to claim title to the disputed property.” Phoenix East Ass’n, Inc. v. Perdido Dunes Condominium Owners Ass’n, 2024 WL 1514608 (Ala. 2024). And how does one show that? By showing that the adverse possessor “possessed” the property without permission—in other words

Reaffirming the basic mechanics of adverse possession a Virginia court holds that successive adverse possessors can tack their time together to meet the statutory period. So an adverse possessor who occupies land for 10 years and sells their property to a buyer who also occupies it for five more years satisfies a 15-year requirement for adverse possession. And when the record owner sells their property, they have now lost title to the adversely possessed property and have no power to transfer that property to their buyer. The recording statutes do not protect the buyer because they are on constructive notice of what an inspection of the property would show, i.e., that their neighbor is occupying property described in the deed. That inquiry would reveal the transfer of title by adverse possession and so the buyer is not actually a “bona fide purchaser” without notice. See Ho v. Rahman, 896 S.E.2d

The Massachusetts Land Court has ruled that a married couple that owned a 1/3 interest as tenants in common with other owners lost their interest by adverse possession to their cotenants because their predecessors in interest had failed to use the area after they were “ousted” by their cotenants. Kane v. Harrington, 30 LCR 579, 2022 Mass. LCR LEXIS 90, 2022 WL 4533930 (Mass. Land Ct. 2022). In general, co-owners do not lose a commonly-held property interest merely because they do not use it. All co-owners have the right to possess the entire property so doing so does not constitute a trespass against other co-owners. Only when a tenant in common actually excludes another cotenant from the property (or tells them they are not welcome to use the property and does not allow them access) does the statute of limitations for adverse possession begin. That moment of “ouster” does start the