In Majestic Oaks Homeowners Ass’n v. Majestic Oaks Farms, Inc., 530 S.2d 3 435 (Ky. 2017), covenants for a residential subdivision creates easements that were subject to abolition by a supermajority vote of the homeowners. The Kentucky Supreme Court saw no reason not to allow easements to be made defeasible and upheld the power of the association to end the easements.
The Georgia Supreme Court has interpreted a will leaving land to the “surviving heir or heirs” of the decedent’s child as creating a life estate in the child with a contingent remainder in the child’s heirs. Anderson v. Anderson, 791 S.E. 2d 40 (Ga. 2016)
The courts continue to divide over the question of whether it is fair to allow homeowners associations to impose retroactive restraints on leasing on existing owners who purchased with no notice of the restriction. While most states allow this, a few do not, and the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) §6.10(2), §6.10 cmt. g, takes the position that such major changes in property rights can only be accomplished prospectively unless there is a unanimous vote to alter those rights. The Idaho Supreme Court recently adopted what appears to be the majority approach, authorizing a homeowners association to retroactively prohibit existing owners from agreeing to short term rentals of less than six months. Adams v. Kimberley One Townhouse Owner’s Ass’n, 352 P.3d 492 (Idaho 2015). In contrast, the Supreme Court of Washington refused to allow retroactive restraints on short term rentals in Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Commties. Ass’n, 327 P.3d 614 (Wash. 2014), requiring unanimous approval for such …
Retroactive restraints on leasing in homeowners associations Read More »
The Massachusetts Land Court decided an interesting case interpreting a conveyance that reads like a right of first refusal but can be interpreted as a broader restraint on alienation giving discretion to a nonprofit entity to refuse absolutely to any transfer of the land. Gottlieb v. Girl Scouts of E. Mass., 2016 WL 3523859 (Mass. Land Ct. 2016). The conveyance stated that “before [charitable organization A] shall sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of the [land, it] shall first offer said land to [charitable organization B] as an unencumbered gift, sale or otherwise to be used by [charitable organization B] for any charitable or civic purpose…” The court found that the clause was not a use restriction but a limit on transfer and thus a restraint on alienation. It also found that it was not a right of first refusal because it did not require purchasing the property at fair market value or matching a bona fide third party …
Distinguishing between a right of first refusal and a restraint on alienation Read More »
In a standard application of traditional estates doctrine, the Massachusetts Appeals Court has found a fee simple absolute despite language in the grant to the YWCA stating that the property was given “in trust, nevertheless, for the uses, purposes and trusts aforesaid.” Young Women’s Christian Ass’n, Inc. of Boston, Inc. v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Philadelphia, Inc., 90 Mass. App. Ct. 1119, 2016 WL 7162737 (Table) (Mass. 2016). Traditionally any language in a conveyance of a fee simple that explains the “purpose” of the transfer or the “use” to which it is to be put, is interpreted as precatory language that has no legal effect on the title that is conveyed. The interpretive principle of the “presumption against forfeitures” suggests that any retained future interest or right of control in the grantor must be created explicitly and unambiguously. Some courts interpret this language to create an implied trust, or a fee simple …
In Bac Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Savankham, 2016 Mass. LCR LEXIS 86 (Mass. Land Ct. 2016), a mother gave a bank a mortgage on her joint tenancy interest in property she shared with her two children. The children did not know about or participate in the transaction. Apparently, the bank thought it was getting a mortgage on the whole property rather than just the joint tenancy interest of one joint tenant and sought to reform the documents to reflect that understanding. However, because there was no proof that all parties understood the transaction this way, it was a unilateral mistake of the bank rather than a mutual mistake of all owners and the lender. The court refused to reform the documents to reflect the arrangement the bank wanted or thought it was getting. A word to the wise, I suppose. You really need to do a title search to make sure …
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has reaffirmed and applied the doctrine of estoppel by deed in the case of Shedden v. Anadarko E. & P. Co., L.P, 136 A.3d 485 (Pa. 2016) and distinguished it from the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Equitable estoppel “recognizes that an informal promise implied by one’s words, deeds or representations which leads another to rely justifiably thereon to his own injury or detriment, may be enforced in equity” while “[i]n contrast, the doctrine of estoppel by deed precludes one who conveys an interest in land that he does not own, but subsequently acquires the title thereto, from denying the validity of the first conveyance.” In this case, an owner leased oil and gas rights to a 62-acre parcel while actually owning only 50% of them. When the owner later acquired the other 50% of the oil and gas rights, the doctrine of estoppel by deed folded those …
The California Supreme Court held in Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp.,, 365 P.3d 845 (Cal. 2016), that a borrower has standing to prove that a nonjudicial foreclosure was wrongful because an assignment by which the foreclosing entity purportedly took a beneficial interest was void, thereby depriving the foreclosing party of any authority to foreclose through a trustee’s sale. In a follow up case, Sciarratta v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 399 (2016), the Court of Appeals held that foreclosure by an entity with no power to foreclose is, by itself, the tort of wrongful foreclosure. Even if the borrower is in default, and someone has the right to foreclose, that does not mean that any person with a claim can bring the foreclosure. Only a party with a better claim to title — someone with the legal authority to foreclose — can oust a peaceable possessor from their home. …
The Texas Supreme Court held that a transfer of land to a city with an option to repurchase if the property were ever used for non-park purposes constituted a fee simple subject to condition subsequent and that the right of entry was a property right for purposes of the takings clause and compensable when then city failed to honor the condition. El Dorado Land Co., L.P. v. City of McKinney, 395 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. 2013). The deed provided that the conveyance was “subject to the requirement and restriction that the property shall be used only as a Community Park” and gave the grantor the right to repurchase the property at the price the city paid for it or the current fair market value whichever was less if the property were not used for the designated purpose. Although the repurchase right was called an option to purchase, the Texas Supreme Court interpreted it …
Right of entry held to be compensable under the takings clause Read More »
A deed granting an interest to two siblings (Roger & Dana Waid) “or the survivor” was interpreted as created a tenancy in common rather than a joint tenancy. Young v. Waid, 2012 WL 2947590, (W.Va. 2012). Following the death of Roger, Dana would have had a 100 % interest in the property if they held as joint tenants (because of her right of survivorship) but only a 50 % interest (with 50% held by Roger’s heir or devisees) if they held as tenants in common. Applying an interpretive presumption in favor of tenancies in common, the West Virginia Supreme Court noted that the deed did not use the words “joint tenancy” or “right of survivorship” and that it was possible the words “to the survivor” were mere surplusage. The court found the language not clear enough to constitute an intent to create a right of survivorship, effectively privileging giving each sibling (and …
Ambiguous “survivor” reference creates a tenancy in common rather than a joint tenancy Read More »
