Wills and Inheritance

Restraints on sale of tenancy in common interests are void even if intended to keep the property in the family

A homeowner created a trust that would transfer title to her home to her three children at her death, but also provided that the children could not sell the property to anyone but their siblings and for an amount below fair market value. A state court in California held the restraint on alienation unreasonable and void both because it severely limited the class of potential buyers and denied the owners the fair market value of their interests. Godoy v. Linzer, 327 Cal. Rptr. 3d 323 (Ct. App. 2024). The court was applying a long-established California statute that provides that restraints on alienation are void when “repugnant to the interest created.” Ca. Civ. Code §711. That provision has been interpreted to allow restraints on alienation when reasonable, but the court found that there is a very strong presumption of invalidity of restraints on fee simple interests. Courts sometimes uphold restraints on …

Restraints on sale of tenancy in common interests are void even if intended to keep the property in the family Read More »

Seventh Circuit adopts a slayer rule for inheritance of ERISA benefits

common law preventing a son from inheriting pension benefit funds in a plan managed by ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) when he murdered his parent. Standard Ins. co. v. Guy, 115 F.4th 518 (6th Cir. 2024). The case seems to be replay of the famous opinion by the New York Court of Appeals in Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). The Riggs opinion has this famous quote: “But it never could have been [the lawmakers’] intention that a donee who murdered the testator to make the will operative should have any benefit under it. If such a case had been present to their minds, and it had been supposed necessary to make some provision of law to meet it, it cannot be doubted that they would have provided for it.” The Sixth Circuit viewed ERISA as “silent or ambiguous” on the question of whether a …

Seventh Circuit adopts a slayer rule for inheritance of ERISA benefits Read More »

Promise to make a gift at death enforceable if relied on by continued cohabitation

The New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that a promise to give a gift at death if she continued to live with him until his death is enforceable even though it does not satisfy the state statute of wills if the promisor receives consideration for the promise, and continued cohabitation after the promise suffices. Tremblay v. Bald, 2024 WL 332101 (N.H. 2024). The contract was enforceable even though the decedent died intestate and could have, but did not, convert the written promise into a formal will.

Texas Supreme Court interprets life estate as a fee simple because the remainders were subject to divestment

In Jordan v. Parker, 2022 WL 17998227 (Tex. Dec. 30, 2022), the Texas Supreme Court held that a conveyance of a life estate actually conveyed a fee simple since the remainders were subject to alteration or even complete divestment by the life estate owner. In this case, a man devised his entire estate to his widow for life with remainders in their children, but the devise gave the widow complete power to transfer both the life estate property and to redirect ownership of the remainders. Part of the estate was a fractional ownership interest in a ranch. Some years later, while the widow was still alive, a son who was a remainder owner conveyed his remainder interest to his daughters (the granddaughters of the widow and the testator). The widow never exercised her power to alter the remainders in her children during her lifetime, and the question was whether the widow …

Texas Supreme Court interprets life estate as a fee simple because the remainders were subject to divestment Read More »

Statutory share statute gives surviving spouse a portion of the estate of the decedent

Applying the terms of a long-existing state statute, the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts affirmed that a second spouse could take 1/3 of her deceased husband’s estate when he failed to rewrite his will after his second marriage and his will had left his entire estate to his first wife. Ciani v. MacGrath, 114 N.E.3d 52 (Mass. 2019); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 191, §15. The court also read the state statute to give the surviving spouse a life estate in the family house rather than just a right to a share of its income.

Will devising home to testator’s four children and his widow that allowed her to “remain” in the home “for as long as she desires” gave her a tenancy in common interest with protection from removal by partition

In an older case that came to my attention, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a will that gave a widow the right to “remain” in the home “for as long as she desires” did not create a life estate when her interest was shared with the decedent’s four children. Hershman-Tcherepnin v. Tcherepnin, 891 N.E.2d 194 (Mass. 2008). Rather, the court interpreted the conveyance to create tenancy in common interests shared equally by the five while giving the widow immunity from being forced from the house by partition. Significantly, the court did not consider that restraint on partition to constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation. However, since she had brought an action to partition the property, she waived the right to be protected from ouster through partition sale.

Lease cannot transfer landlord’s right to receive rents to his daughter after his death because it is a testamentary transfer that does not comply with the formalities needed to create a will

The MIssissippi Supreme Court held that a lease provision cannot transfer the landlord’s power to receive rents to his daughter after his death because that effectuates a testamentary transfer that must comply with the statute of wills to be valid, including all formalities such as two witnesses. Estate of Greer v. Ball, 218 So. 3d 1136 (Miss. 2017).

Fee simple absolute found despite language of “in trust” and “for the uses, purposes” of the YWCA

In a standard application of traditional estates doctrine, the Massachusetts Appeals Court has found a fee simple absolute despite language in the grant to the YWCA stating that the property was given “in trust, nevertheless, for the uses, purposes and trusts aforesaid.” Young Women’s Christian Ass’n, Inc. of Boston, Inc. v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Philadelphia, Inc., 90 Mass. App. Ct. 1119, 2016 WL 7162737 (Table) (Mass. 2016). Traditionally any language in a conveyance of a fee simple that explains the “purpose” of the transfer or the “use” to which it is to be put, is interpreted as precatory language that has no legal effect on the title that is conveyed. The interpretive principle of the “presumption against forfeitures” suggests that any retained future interest or right of control in the grantor must be created explicitly and unambiguously. Some courts interpret this language to create an implied trust, or a fee simple …

Fee simple absolute found despite language of “in trust” and “for the uses, purposes” of the YWCA Read More »

Heirs under intestacy statute include adopted children

In a decision one might think was unnecessary today, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the “children” who inherit under state intestacy statutes include adopted children. Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Wheeler, 132 A.3d 1178, 2016 ME 26 (Me. 2016). The issue was raised because an earlier court decision interpreting the decedent’s will had held that a separate clause leaving property to the decedent’s “issue” went to biological children (in this case grandchildren) only. This clause did not affect another clause, at issue here, that referred to the state’s intestacy statute to govern distribution of property upon termination of the trust.

New York law protects inheritance rights of children conceived after the death of their biological parents

New York state has adopted a statute that defines procedures for ensuring that children conceived after the death of their biological parents can inherit property, receive Social Security survivor benefits, and benefit from trusts established for them. The law applies to  ova or sperm that are stored for use after the death of a biological parent, usually when that parent knows his or her lifespan is limited. The law requires a written declaration of the purpose for which the biological material was stored, recording of the document in public records, and requires the genetic child to be in utero within 24 months or born within 33 months of the death of the genetic parent. read article

Scroll to Top